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Issues and Findings 
Discussed in this Brief: The find-
ings of two field studies of acoustic 
sensing systems designed to detect 
the sound of a muzzle blast from a 
gun and, within seconds of the shot 
being fired, triangulate within some 
margin of error the location from 
which the shot was fired, before 
alerting the police about the gun-
shot. The research team examined 
the effectiveness of Trilon Tech-
nology's ShotSpotterTM system, 
which the local police department 
has operated in Redwood City, 
California, since early 1996, and 
the Alliant Techsystems Inc.'s 
SECURES™ system, which police in-
stalled for 2 months in a neighbor-
hood with high levels of random 
gunfire in Dallas, Texas, in 1996. 
This Research in Brief also outlines 
how the police used the technology 
in Dallas and what officers working 
in the study sites think of gunshot 
detection systems. 
Key issues: Anecdotal evidence 
from the media and interviews with 
local officials, police, and commu-
nity members suggests that random 
gunfire is considered a serious 
problem in many large cities in the 
United States. Random gunfire has 
been defined as "the indiscriminate 
discharge of firearms into the air," 
which generally occurs during holi-
lS, during weekends 
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Random Gunfire Problems and 
Gunshot Detection Systems 
by Lorraine Green Mazerolle, Cory Watkins, Dennis Rogan, and James Frank 
Random gunfire is a significant prob-
lem in many large cities throughout the 
United States. 1 Random gunfire has been 
defined as "the indiscriminate discharge 
of firearms into the air," which generally 
occurs during the celebration of holidays, 
during weekends or sporting events, and 
often in the context of drinking.2 
Communities across the United States 
have instituted a variety of efforts to re-
duce random gunfire problems, including 
public awareness campaigns and the use 
of technological devices to detect and 
alert the police to incidents of gunshots 
and explosions. Generically known as 
"gunshot detection systems," the technol-
ogy includes an acoustic sensing system 
capable of identifying, discriminating, 
and reporting gunshots to the police 
within seconds of a shot being fired.3 
This Research in Brief summarizes the 
findings of field studies of two gunshot 
detection systems: Trilon Technology's 
ShotSpotter™ system, which has oper-
ated in Redwood City, California, since 
early 1996, and Alliant Techsystems 
Inc.'s SECURES™ system, installed 
for 2 months in 1996 in a neighborhood 
with high levels of random gunfire in 
Dallas, Texas. This Research in Brief 
also outlines how the police used the 
gunshot detection system in Dallas and 
what officers working in the test sites 
think of the technology. 
What is known about 
random gunfire problems 
Random gunfire problems are distin-
guishable from other types of shooting 
incidents such as urban sniper attacks, 
gang shootouts, domestic homicides, and 
revenge shootings because (1) random 
gunfire is strictly an outdoor activity; 
(2) it is not usually part of other criminal 
activity such as drug dealing, assaults, 
or robberies; and (3) random gunfire 
shooters do not fire their weapons to 
intentionally injure or kill people. 
In many U.S. urban areas, random gunfire 
is considered a problem, typically involv-
ing people drinking alcohol and watching 
televised sporting events and then walk-
ing outside to fire their weapons into the 
air in celebration. People also tend to 
fire their weapons on New Year's Eve, 
Cinco de Mayo, Fourth of July, and other 
significant holidays. Police report that 
random gunfire shooters believe their 
actions are harmless. Shooters state that 
firing their weapons in the air does not 
endanger lives or damage property.4 
Policymakers, police department person-
nel, city prosecutors, and community 
residents across the United States have 
implemented a variety of initiatives to 
control serious shooting and other gun-
related problems. 5 Yet only a few local 
governments have developed programs 
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gunfire is strictly an outdoor 
activity; (2) it is not usually part of 
other criminal activity such as drug 
dealing, assaults, or robberies; and 
(3) random gunfire shooters do not 
fire their weapons to intentionally 
injure or kill people. 
Residents in communities with high 
levels of random gunfire live in per-
petual fear; and law-abiding busi-
ness owners and residents freely 
express their willingness to aban-
don or relocate from a neighbor-
hood with random gunfire 
problems. 
Key findings: The study of the use 
of gunshot detection technology 
in local law enforcement led the 
research team to four broad 
conclusions: 
• Gunshot detection systems are 
likely to reveal rather high citizen 
under-reporting rates of random 
gunfire problems (23 percent of 
incidents are reported). 
• The technology is likely to in-
crease the workloads of police 
officers, particularly if departments 
dispatch a patrol unit to every 
gunfire incident detected by a 
technological system. 
• Gunshot detection systems are 
not likely to lead to more arrests 
of people firing weapons in urban 
settings because it is highly unlikely 
that offenders will stay at a gun-
shot location long enough for the 
police to arrive. 
• Finally, gunshot detection 
systems seem to offer the most 
potential as a problem-solving tool 
and would fit nicely within the 
emerging problem-oriented polic-
ing paradigm. The technology can 
help police identity random gunf1re 
hot spots and develop strategies to 
address the problem. 
Target audience: Local police 
administrators, local government 
officials, community groups, and 
researchers. 
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problems. In cities such as Dallas (the 
police department's Gunshot Awareness 
Program), New Orleans (Gunshot Public 
Awareness Program), Redwood City 
(Operation Silent Night Program), and St. 
Louis (Town Criers' Program), community 
awareness campaign volunteers and the 
police work together to inform people of 
the dangers of random gunfire. 
Anecdotal evidence from newspaper 
articles," television broadcasts,7 and 
interviews with police department offi-
cials11 and community members'J suggests 
that random gunfire is a serious problem 
in many cities. Residents in these com-
munities live in perpetual fear: they worry 
that a stray bullet will kill an innocent by-
stander; they feel they live in the middle 
of a war zone on some nights; they hide in 
their homes, afraid to confront the people 
disrupting their lives; and law-abiding 
business owners and residents are willing 
to abandon or relocate from a neighbor-
hood with random gunfire problems.H1 
One Redwoorl City n~sirlent summerlup 
the problem by stating: 
It is not uncommon to find bullets 
lodged in front porches or gutters. 
We are afraid for our children. 
The random gunfire problem is also 
costly in terms of law enforcement, 
property damage, and declining 
property values. 
The number of deaths from firearms-
related injuries is recognized as a signifi-
cant national public health problem. In 
the United States in 1996, for example, 
there were 12.8 deaths per 100,000 
people caused by firearms-related inju-
ries. For males 15 to 24 years old, the 
problem is even more staggering: in 1996, 
there were 38.9 deaths from injuries sus-
tained by firearms per 100,000 people. 11 
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:s. The statistics also fail to differ-
enuate between random gunfire and 
other criminal incidents when shots are 
fired, such as drive-by shootings, revenge 
shootings, shootings during drug transac-
tions, and so forth. As such, there is very 
little systematic information about the 
extent, environmental causes, social 
context, and societal costs of the random 
gunfire problem. 
The study neighborhood 
The Dallas study began with a systematic 
analysis of the random gunfire problem 
in that city's Oakcliff neighborhood. Re-
searchers reviewed videotapes of street 
block attributes, conducted onsite obser-
vations and interviews, and reviewed 
police officer patrol logs to develop a 
comprehensive view of factors contribut-
ing to the random gunfire problem. 
Oak cliff is composed primarily of resi-
dential rental units mixed with light 
industrial and commercial enterprises. 
The community is situated between two 
major commercial corridors with a park 
and large lake on its northern border. 
The majority of Oakcliff residents are 
economically poor and lease their apart-
ments. Fewer than 20 percent of the 
Oak cliff residents own their own homes, 
compared with a citywide ownership rate 
of more than 50 percent and a nationwide 
ownership rate of 59 percent. 12 The aver-
age monthly rent in the Oakcliff commu-
nity is $295. By contrast, more than 
90 percent of Dallas residents pay more 
than $300 in rent per month, and, of 
these renters, 41 percent pay $500 or 
more per month. 1a 
Oak cliff reports high levels of random 
gunfire: 422 citizen reports of random 
gunfire shots per 10,000 people per year 
in thP 1-sfpum~-mile neigh horhoorl 11 lone. 
Although random gunfire calls represent-
ed 1.1 percent of total police service ealls 
citywide, they represented 4.6 percent of 
I • 
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total calls for service in Oakcliff dur-
ing 1996. Police report no random 
gunfire calls for 65 percent of Oakcliff 
streets (similar to call patterns for 
other crime problems). However, a 
small percentage (5.5 percent) of the 
streets generated nearly 45 percent of 
all random gunfire calls.14 
Researchers examined the social and 
physical attributes of Oak cliff street 
blocks that experienced random gun-
fire calls for service. These results are 
specific to the Oakcliff neighborhood 
and cannot be generalized to Dallas or 
any other community in the United 
States. The research shows predomi-
nately residential street blocks that 
had higher property values or rental 
fees experienced more random gunfire 
calls for service than Oakcliff street 
blocks with lower property values or 
those comprising commercial proper-
ties or vacant blocks.15 Random gun-
fire calls were not generally a problem 
on Oakcliff street blocks that had a 
large proportion of properties in disre-
pair or on streets with high levels of 
physical decay, a lot of foliage, or on 
blocks with relatively high levels of 
calls about serious crime problems.16 
Random gunfire calls were more 
prevalent on street blocks that gener-
ated a substantial number of prowler, 
suspicious person, and disturbance 
calls. This suggests other types of sus-
picious and unruly behavior are prob-
ably correlated with Oakcliffs random 
gunfire problem. 
The study findings are somewhat 
inconsistent with crime and place 
research that finds signs of decay are 
indicative of other social and crime 
problems.17 Nevertheless, the study 
findings suggest random gunfire may 
be a unique type of crime problem not 
necessarily part of, nor indicative of, 
systemic decline and decay on a street 
block. The study results are consistent 
with Dallas police officer perceptions 
that random gunfire problems occur 
in Oakcliffs residential areas, specifi-
cally in the context of people drinking 
in their homes and backyards, watch-
ing sporting events, and celebrating. 
Gunshot detection systems 
What are they? Acoustic gunshot 
detection systems are designed to pick 
up the sound of a muzzle blast from a 
gun and, within seconds of the shot be-
ing fired, pinpoint or triangulate within 
some margin of error the gunshot's 
location, before alerting the police 
about the shot being fired. 
Manufacturers of gunshot detection 
systems expect the technology to in-
crease the ability of the police to get to 
the scene of random gunfire quickly, 
increase the number of people arrested 
for firing weapons, and reduce the det-
rimental effects (injuriP-s, fear, disin-
vestment) of shots being fired in urban 
settings. Community advocates of 
gunshot detection systems believe the 
technology can deter would-be shoot-
ers and improve the quality of life in 
their neighborhoods. 
Alliant Techsystems Inc.'s 
SECURES. The gunshot detection 
system installed in Oakcliff was 
developed and demonstrated by 
Alliant Techsystems Inc. (ATI) and 
subsequently marketed as SECURES 
(System for the Effective Control of 
Urban Environment Security). 
SECURES identifies the location and 
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mitter. Eighty-six pole units were 
erected in the 1-square-mile Oakcliff 
target area to provide adequate system 
coverage for the 2-month study 
period.18 
The pole units are designed to acousti-
cally identify gunshots and transmit 
that information to a police dispatch 
center through a network of transmit-
ters and receivers connected to the 
local phone system. The gunshot loca-
tion and time are transmitted to a per-
sonal computer in the dispatch center 
in less than 2 seconds, and the gunfire 
information is displayed on a comput-
erized map, enabling dispatchers to 
relay the information to officers on 
the street. 
The SECURES prototype alerts police 
dispatchers to the location of the first 
pole unit to detect a shot. A TI claims, 
however, that subsequent enhance-
ments to the system "triangulate" 
gunfire alerts such that real-time 
information from responding pole units 
pinpoint the precise location from 
which the shot was fired. A TI claims 
this type of "triangulation" procedure 
can pinpoint 99 percent of gunshots 
within a 65-foot radius of the firing 
spot, 88 percent of gunshots within 
30 feet, 63 percent of gunshots within 
20 feet, and 35 percent of gunshots 
within lO feet. 19 
Trilon Technology's ShotSpotter. 
The ShotSpotter gunshot detection 
technology installed in Redwood City 
was designed and demonstrated by 
Trilon Technology. The ShotSpotter 
system, installed in the 1-square-mile 
Redwood Village area since early 
1996, consists of eight acoustic sen-
sors, a central computer located in the 
Redwood City Police Department's 
dispatch center, and gunshot detection 
and location identification software. 
••• Research in Brief • •• 
The acoustic sensors include micro-
phones, acoustic sensing elements, 
and gunshot identification electronics. 
The sensors installed in Redwood Vil-
lage resemble birdhouses and heating 
vents and are enclosed in weatherproof 
containers approximately 1 cubic foot 
in size. The acoustic sensors detect 
muzzle blasts from gunfire or other 
explosions and then transmit the 
sound of the gunfire via telephone 
line to a central computer located in 
a police department dispatch center. 
Parameter settings in the ShotSpotter 
software determine the system's level 
of sensitivity: if the thresholds are set 
quite high, background noise is less 
often identified as gunfire. Conversely, 
if the thresholds are set quite low, 
more background noise can be de-
tected as gunfire, increasing the poten-
tial that extraneous noises will be 
incorrectly identified as gunfire.20 
Once the sensors detect a sound and 
transmit the information to the central 
computer, the ShotSpotter software 
discriminates against most other com-
munity sounds (such as car backfires, 
jackhammers, thunder, and barking 
dogs) and pinpoints the location of the 
gunfire or explosions. Gunshot events 
are displayed on a computer map in 
the police dispatch center within ap-
proximately 15 seconds of the noise 
being made. The computer map distin-
guishes property boundaries, including 
front or side yards, curbsides, or street 
corners. 
Determination of the precise location 
of gunfire events is conducted through 
a series of iterations of triangulation 
algorithms. The system can generate 
an overview map that presents the 
locations of historical shootings to 
discern patterns in space or time. The 
ShotSpotter computer can be placed in 
a dispatch center with stand-alone or 
integrated outputs, or it can be placed 
at a remote site.21 
The ShotSpotter system stores all 
waveforms for every detected gunfire 
event and 6 seconds of audio from 
each detecting acoustic sensor 
(2.3 megabytes each). As such, a 
significant amount of system memory 
is required when numerous gunfire 
events occur simultaneously or when 
many noises are relayed to the system 
in quick succession (during New 
Year's Eve or Fourth of July, for ex-
ample). Once the ShotSpotter system 
detects a shot and reports the location 
on the computer screen, dispatchers 
can play back the 6-second snippet of 
sound from any sensor to assist them 
in determining what they believe to be 
the true source of the sound: fire-
cracker string, multiple gunshots, 
shotgun blast, or car backfire. The 
ability to play back the sound of the 
apparent gunfire alert is unique to 
ShotSpotter and offers police an oppor-
tunity to determine whether they think 
the sound is in fact gunfire. 
Do they work? 
The Redwood City Police Department, 
the San Mateo County Sheriffs Office, 
and Trilon Technology agreed to sub-
mit the ShotSpotter system to a series 
of field trials. The police department 
approved the firing of test blanks un-
der controlled conditions to measure 
the performance of the technology in 
June 1997.22 Similar permissions were 
not granted during the field test of the 
SECURES system in Dallas. 
The evaluation team worked with po-
lice department personnel to select 
weapon types, the number of shots to 
be fired, and the times and locations 
from which test shots would be fired. 
The police suggested that three 
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weapon types be used: an MP5 assault 
rifle, a .38 caliber pistol, and a 12 
gauge shotgun. The police department 
notified community residents and 
business owners about the inordinate 
number of shots that would be fired 
during the field test to avoid calls from 
concerned citizens about the gunfire. 
All test shots were fired from side-
walks at intersections or along street 
blocks. 
The evaluation team assessed the 
performance of the ShotS potter system 
based on three outcomes: 
• Did the ShotSpotter gunshot 
detection system annunciate and 
triangulate the "shot" location 
(true positive)? 
• Did ShotSpotter fail to annunciate 
or triangulate the "shot" location 
(false negative)? 
• What was the location error from 
the true shot location to the triangu-
lated shot location (in feet)? 
Exhibit 1 presents the results of the 
field trial, examining the breakdown of 
results for each weapon type and each 
of the evaluation outcomes (annuncia-
tion and location error). 
Of the 31 field trial events, 8 tested 
the MP5 assault rifle, 13 tested 
the .38 caliber pistol rounds, and 
10 tested the 12 gauge shotgun. The 
technology annunciated shotgun tests 
at the highest rate (90 percent), fol-
lowed by pistol tests (77 percent), and 
the MP5 assault rifle (63 percent). 
Overall, the ShotSpotter technology 
annunciated nearly 80 percent of the 
test shots (true positives) and failed 
to annunciate random gunfire events 
about 20 percent of the time (false 
negatives). It should be noted that the 
muzzle blast waveform from blank 
rounds is different from the muzzle 
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Exhibit 1. Redwood City's ShotSpotter Field Trial Results 
Total Number 
of Gunfire 
Events 
MP5 Assault Rifle 8 
.38 Caliber Pistol 13 
12 Gauge Shotgun 10 
blast waveform from live rounds; it can 
be difficult for gunshot detection tech-
nologies to discriminate between the 
two.23 Therefore, the ShotSpotter tech-
nology should annunciate significantly 
more than 80 percent of gunfire inci-
dents when live rounds are fired under 
real-life conditions. 
The ShotSpotter system identified and 
triangulated random gunfire events 
within about 25 feet of the true shot 
location. Shotgun events had the low-
est median location error of 23.5 feet; 
pistol events were correctly identified 
within 25 feet of the true shot location; 
and the MP5 assault rifle tests were 
identified within 27 feet of the correct 
firing location. 
Random gunfire alerts and 
police response 
Citizen reporting of a gunshot fired is 
typically dependent on (1) the citizen 
hearing the shot, (2) the citizen identi-
fying the noise to be gunfire, (3) the 
citizen making the decision to call the 
police shortly after the shot has been 
fired, and (4) the citizen telling the 
police the location from which the 
shot was fired. Prior to the introduc-
tion of the gunshot detection system in 
Dallas, the police took approximately 
20 minutes to dispatch a citizen call 
about random gunfire and an addi-
tional 5 minutes to respond (arrive on 
the scene) to citizen alerts in the study 
area. This response pattern was con-
Percent of Median 
Shots Location 
Annunciated Error (In Feet) 
63 27.0 
77 25.0 
90 23.5 
sistent with the low priority response 
the police department placed on ran-
dom gunfire calls. Officers typically 
stayed on the scene of a call for about 
15 minutes. In total, citizens' random 
gunfire reporting calls took approxi-
mately 40 minutes to clear from the 
time the call was placed to the time 
the officer concluded the investigation 
of the scene. 24 
The introduction of gunshot detection 
systems in Dallas removed the citizen 
contingencies influencing random 
gunfire reporting and somewhat 
changed the patterns of police re-
sponse. During the field trial in Dallas, 
the police received 188 alerts of gun-
fire from the SECURES system and 
49 citizen calls. They subsequently 
dispatched 151 of the SECURES 
alerts and 39 of the citizen calls.25 
The police dispatched both citizen 
calls and SECURES alerts quicker 
during the field trial (13 minutes and 
18 minutes, respectively) than before 
the introduction of the gunshot loca-
tion system. The police continued to 
take about 5 minutes to arrive on 
the scene for a citizen alert and about 
7 minutes for a SECURES alert. Once 
on the scene, the police cleared the 
citizen call quicker (12 minutes) than 
before the field trial, yet they took 
significantly longer to clear the 
SECURES alert (19 minutes). It is 
possible the police spent less time on 
citizen calls about random gunfire due 
to the greater total number of random 
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gunfire alerts generated by the gunshot 
location system and the subsequent 
increase in the number of dispatches 
for random gunfire alerts.26 Overall, 
the Dallas police received and cleared 
citizen random gunfire calls in about 
30 minutes, and they received and 
cleared SECURES alerts in about 
44 minutes during the field trial. 
Using gunshot detection 
systems 
During the 2-month Dallas field trial, 
the police made 190 radio runs (151 
SECURES ale!ts and 39 citizen random 
gunfire calls) in the 1-square-mile 
Oakcliff community.27 The number of 
citizen calls during the field trial was 
similar to the average number of citi-
zen calls to the police about random 
gunfire incidents prior to the field 
trial.28 As such, the extra SECURES-
dispatched radio runs over and above 
the citizen-initiated calls during the 
field trial represent an almost fivefold 
increase (190/39=4.87) in the number 
of police dispatches to random gunfire 
problems. 
Alliant Techsystems Inc. claims 
SECURES correctly identifies 88 
percent of all shots whose propagation 
path to the microphone is not blocked 
by a close building.29 The acoustic 
database used to support this claim 
was collected by A TI during tests 
conducted at military proving grounds 
and police test ranges and when live 
rounds were fired in open field envi-
ronments as well as among building 
structures.30 Thus, assuming theSE-
CURES true-positive rate is correct, 
the field trial suggests that many ran-
dom gunfire incidents are not reported 
by citizens.31 
••• 
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How should the police respond to an 
inordinate increase in random gunfire 
alerts? Indeed, introduction of the 
technology challenges the police to 
carefully consider the manner in 
which they mobilize their resources to 
respond to alerts: on the one hand, the 
technology provides police with much 
more information about random gun-
fire problems than previously gener-
ated through citizen calls. If the ATI 
claim that SECURES fails to detect 
only 12 percent of all shots and if the 
citizen reporting figure of 23 percent 
of all random gunfire incidents in the 
Dallas field trial is accurate,32 then 
one can reasonably conclude that gun-
shot detection systems provide the 
police with important insights as to 
the nature, extent, and locations of 
random gunshots. 
On the other hand, the increase in ran-
dom gunfire alerts has the potential to 
significantly influence the delivery of 
police services. The nearly fivefold in-
crease in radio dispatches represents a 
significant increase in the police 
workload for a very small geographic 
area (less than 1 square mile). More-
over, during the study period, not a 
single arrest was made in response to a 
dispatch for random gunfire in Dallas, 
and police officers patrolling Oakcliff 
spent less time processing citizen calls 
for random gunfire during the field test 
(compared with the time spent on 
citizen calls before the field trial) to 
handle the large increase in radio runs 
generated by the SECURES technology.33 
What do police think of 
gunshot detection systems? 
Patrol officers from both the Dallas 
and Redwood City police departments 
were surveyed about their perceptions 
of the impact of gunshot detection 
systems on their work routine, their 
confidence in the technology to report 
gunfire incidents, and their percep-
tions of the ability of the technology 
to improve police effectiveness in 
handling such incidents. All officers 
assigned to areas in which the tech-
nology was deployed and they could 
possibly be dispatched to gunshot in-
cidents received questionnaires. In 
Dallas, 58 percent (124 of 212) of 
patrol officers completed the question-
naires, while in Redwood City, 66 
percent (27 of 41) of patrol officers 
returned the questionnaires. 
As happens with many technological 
and strategic innovations introduced 
into police departments,34 patrol offi-
cers from both Dallas and Redwood 
City reported some frustrations with 
the gunshot detection systems. They 
generally lacked confidence in the 
ability of the systems to identify and 
locate gunfire occurrences. They also 
worried about false alerts, and they 
expressed concern about the time 
spent responding to gunfire alerts and 
the low likelihood of catching or ar-
resting the shooter. 
Officers in both cities feel they are 
more likely to talk with citizens when 
responding to citizen-generated calls 
than to gunshot detection system calls, 
and they make more problem-solving 
progress on citizen alerts than technol-
ogy alerts. Generally, officers feel 
citizen calls about gunfire give them 
a focal point in responding to the call. 
Officers can ask the citizen about what 
he or she heard, and they can glean 
details about the context of the shot 
fired. By contrast, officers explain that 
the gunshot detection systems provide 
no details about the apparent shot, 
leaving them without any guidance to 
pursue an investigation. 
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Summing up 
The study of the use of gunshot detec-
tion technology in local law enforce-
ment led the research team to four 
broad conclusions: 
• Gunshot detection systems are 
likely to reveal rather high citizen 
under-reporting rates of random 
gunfire problems. 
• The technology is likely to increase 
the workloads of police officers, 
particularly if departments dispatch 
a patrol unit to every gunfire inci-
dent detected by a technological 
system. 
• Gunshot detection systems are not 
likely to lead to more arrests of 
people firing weapons in urban set-
tings because it is highly unlikely 
that offenders will stay at a gunshot 
location long enough for the police 
to arrive.35 
• Finally, gunshot detection systems 
seem to offer the most potential as 
a problem-solving tool and would 
fit nicely within the emerging 
problem-oriented policing para-
digm. The technology can help 
police identify random gunfire hot 
spots and develop strategies to 
address the problem. 
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